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Corporate spin-offs have been a major “preferred” restructuring technique in the previous couple decades in 
the U.S. This corporate transaction aims to create value for both divesting firm and its subsidiary. This study 
examines an understudied interaction of CEO external directorships and age (as well as their direct effects) in 
the strategy literature on the change in market valuation of spun-off subsidiaries. By drawing our cases from 
the SDC Platinum database, we identified 138 completed corporate U.S. spin-offs that took place between 2000 
and 2014. Our empirical analysis indicates that the number of CEO external directorships as well as having a 
younger CEO positively and significantly affect the change in market valuation. In addition, our interaction 
effect shows significant results. Grounded in the upper echelons and resource dependence theories, this study 
contributes to the corporate governance literature in terms of understanding whether two particular CEO 
characteristics and their interactions hold a great deal of importance for spun-off subsidiaries’ market 
performance. From the perspective of managerial implications, this study suggests that having a younger CEO 








Corporate spin-offs, as a unique form of corporate restructuring mechanism (Makhija, 2004), aim to 
create better value for both the divesting firm (parent firm) and its spun-off subsidiary (child firm). The 
ultimate goal of this mechanism is to create better shareholder value for both the divesting firm and 
its subsidiary in addition to creating an increase in their market performance (Maxwell and Rao, 2003). 
In the spin-off literature, there has been a number of studies that examine both antecedents and 
consequences of corporate spin-offs including their performance (Ahn and Walker, 2007; Feldman, 
2016(a); Feldman, 2016(b); Feldman, 2016(c); Iturriaga and Cruz, 2008; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; 
Semadeni and Cannella, 2011; Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2004; Woolley, 2017); however, in our 
knowledge, there has been no research exploring the change in market valuation of these subsidiaries 
caused by CEO-based antecedents after becoming independent companies. Thus, it is critical to 
answer this following question: Do some particular CEO characteristics (e.g. age and external 
directorships) indeed matter in the context of spun-off subsidiaries’ market performance?




Previous spin-off research has looked at various aspects of these subsidiaries’ successes in the 
market as stand-alone entities following the corporate separation. For instance, Feldman (2016c) finds 
that the presence of dual directors, which refers to parent firm’s board members being simultaneously 
appointed on the child firm’s board, has a positive effect on the average stock market returns of the 
subsidiary. Wruck and Wruck (2002) argue that firm-specific human capital including their expertise in 
governance and upper echelons will have significant impacts on the value creation process by the 
subsidiary. Sapienza, Parhankangas, and Autio (2004)’s research also shows that production and 
technological knowledge relatedness between the parent and child firm will have some significant 
effects on the post-spin-off sales growth of the subsidiary. Although previous research provides 
important cues about the success parameters for corporate spin-offs, there still seems to be a strong 
need of examining effects of CEO-related antecedents in this context. 
CEOs are a very critical part in the corporate governance structure of the firm. According to Aguilera 
et al. (2008), corporate governance is directly related to the level of effectiveness or the degree of 
goal attainment within an organization. More specifically, effective governance structures create a 
positive impact on “the accountability of corporate decision-makers and the legitimacy of decisions 
about their different economic and noneconomic goals and values” (Aguilera et al., 2008: 476). 
Therefore, it is extremely critical to establish these mechanisms in the most effective manner so that 
top executives’ decisions will lead to maximizing firm value, which is the ultimate goal for corporate 
spin-offs. 
According to the upper echelons theory, the CEO, as “the central strategic decision-maker” (Barker 
and Mueller, 2002: 783), possesses the “ultimate power” to influence organizational outcomes (Lewis, 
Walls, and Dowell, 2014). As indicated in a study by Beber and Fabbri (2012), top-level executives make 
critical strategic decisions, which are correlated with their demographic and cognitive characteristics. 
In particular, the “age” factor has been identified as an important indicator of top executives’ 
characteristics in the literature (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). For example, Peni (2014) has found that 
the CEO age has a positive and significant impact on the firm performance measured by return on 
assets. In another study, Barker and Mueller (2002) have found that CEO age is negatively and 
significantly related to firm R&D spending, which means that younger CEOs put more emphasis (and 
interest) on their firms’ R&D efforts. According to the resource dependence theory, external board 
memberships is a “vital” aspect of the organizational life since through these outside ties, directors 
can gain valuable knowledge, access to critical information, establish trust, and learn more about how 
to successfully implement strategies (Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011). Thus, these directors can better 
maintain and enhance their firms’ competitive posture in the industry. For instance, Geletkanycz and 
Boyd (2011) have argued that CEO external directorships have a significant and positive effect on firm’s 
long-term organizational performance measured by return on assets and return on sales. In addition, 
Holbrook (2013) argues that these external board appointments will become a “convincing” factor for 
current and future investors. Therefore, it is clear that CEO age and outside board memberships are 
two very important antecedents to firm performance, which are further examined in the context of 
corporate spin-offs here. 
In this empirical study, our first research question investigates whether CEO age has an impact on 
the change in market valuation of the spun-off subsidiary. Our second research question looks at 
whether CEO external board memberships affect this change. And finally, our third research question 
examines the interaction effect of CEO age and external directorships in this model. Previous research 
in the governance literature strongly suggests that CEO individual characteristics will have very 
important influence on firm performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). CEOs, as key decision-makers, 
are the most critical executives in organizations due to their significant role on the firm’s survival and 
future prospects. As argued by many scholars, CEO age is a good proxy for understanding the level of 
risk taking (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Serfling, 2014) and CEO external board memberships is another 




good proxy for understanding the level of resource availability and existence of critical industry 
connections (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Zona, Gomez-Mejia, and Withers, 2018). In the context of spin-
offs, we believe that both antecedents (as well as their interaction) are critical to the market 
performance of these recently-independent entities. Therefore, we aim to fill a big gap in the literature 
by empirically examining both CEO characteristics so that we will understand how spun-off 
subsidiaries can better perform in the market.  
Our empirical evidence reveals that both CEO age (negatively) and external directorships 
(positively) significantly affect the change in market value of spun-off subsidiaries. In addition, we find 
that their interaction also creates a significant effect on this change. All these significant findings are 
very well-aligned with our theoretical arguments. This paper makes a couple important contributions 
to the strategy literature. First and foremost, our findings prove that CEO demographic characteristics 
indeed matter in the context of corporate spin-offs. Second, we find significant evidence for the 
importance of resource availability and risk taking in the context of spun-off subsidiaries. Third, we are 
able to establish a better understanding on how both direct and interactions effects will be 
significantly important to the market success of spun-off subsidiaries. Thus, by testing a sample of 138 
U.S.-based spin-offs between 2000 and 2014, we offer a unique framework that explains how CEO age 
and external board memberships will matter in this specific corporate restructuring context.  
This paper is organized as follows. After briefly explaining what corporate spin-offs are, we present 
three hypotheses. This is followed by our methodology and results sections. Then, we discuss our 
results including limitations, future research directions, and managerial implications, which is followed 
by the conclusion. 
 
THE DEFINITION OF CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS 
 
Corporate spin-offs are designed to create value for both the divesting firm and its spun-off subsidiary 
(Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2008). Bowman and Singh (1993) argue that corporate restructuring 
might entail “selling lines of business or making significant acquisitions, changing capital structure 
through infusion of high levels of debt, and changing the internal organization of the firm” (p. 6). In 
this restructuring technique, shares of the subsidiary are distributed to the parent firm’s shareholders 
on a pro rata basis (Desai and Jain, 1999). As a result of this corporate transaction, the spun-off 
subsidiary becomes a publicly-traded, stand-alone entity (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983).  
According to the literature, there are three common reasons why spin-off events occur. First and 
foremost, the spin-off activity enables both the divesting firm and its subsidiary to enhance their 
market valuation and better meet demands of their shareholders (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983). The 
main goal here is to increase the shareholder wealth by announcing the spin-off event, which is 
expected to produce positive abnormal returns (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983). In other words, by 
separating the subsidiary from its parent, the expectation is to place both firms in a better position 
within the market. Secondly, the spin-off event enables top management team members better focus 
on core business operations (Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997). Here, the main goal is to remove 
all unrelated businesses from the portfolio of the parent firm (Daley et al., 1997). Thirdly, spinning off 
a subsidiary (or division) provides investors with a much clearer understanding of the firm’s corporate 
structure including future strategies (Bergh, Johnson, and Dewitt, 2008). In other words, both current 
and potential investors can better understand core operational activities along with related resource 
allocations as a result of this corporate separation (Bergh et al., 2008). Thus, corporate spin-offs can 
be considered an “exciting” approach for both parties that have strategic goals to increase their 
market share and profitability.  
Despite all these positive expectations of the spin-off event, there are important risks associated 
with it. For instance, Iturriaga and Cruz (2008) argue that spin-off events further enable top managers 




to implement fresh ideas and innovations via an accumulation of new knowledge; however, adapting 
to new processes, business operations, governance structures, and management systems might 
create critical complexities and substantial inefficiencies due to the subsidiary’s newly independent 
status (Semadeni and Cannella, 2011). In addition, this situation may create an “identity crisis” for the 
subsidiary since members of the organization might not be sure about their collective state after 
becoming an independent entity (Corley and Gioia, 2004). Furthermore, it is quite possible that the 
subsidiary may face issues regarding the establishment of its legitimacy and credibility within the 
market (Hambrick and Strucker, 1999) since they do not hold any previous proof of “independent 
success” yet. Therefore, it is critical to examine and understand both pros and cons of this 




Aguilera and Jackson (2003) define corporate governance as “the outcome of interactions among 
multiple stakeholders” (p. 449). These mechanisms aim to “ensure that executives respect rights and 
interests of company stakeholders, and that those stakeholders are held accountable for acting 
responsibly regarding the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm” 
(Aguilera et al., 2008: 475). In the strategy literature, it has been commonly argued that the 
governance structure may play a significant role on the firm’s stock market performance (Moore et 
al., 2012) via both harmonizing conflicts of interest between agents and principals and improving the 
wealth of shareholders (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). In particular, as argued in the upper echelons 
theory, the age variable is considered an important proxy for experience and risk taking (Hambrick, 
2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Furthermore, according to the resource dependence theory 
(Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009), external directorships are considered critical sources for the 
possession of industry knowledge and connections in addition to gaining familiarity to diverse strategy 
implementation practices. Thus, we establish our arguments around both governance elements in the 
context of CEOs, who are the “top” decision-makers in organizations, in order to examine the change 




The upper echelons theory holds that the age factor is considered a good proxy for the level of risk 
taking and willingness to initiate changes in the context of top executives (Johnson, Schnatterly, and 
Hill, 2013). Some strategy research has indicated that younger executives are bigger advocates of 
strategic change (Ahn and Walker, 2007; Johnson et al., 2013). In particular, younger executives tend 
to heavily support change (Golden and Zajac, 2001) as well as innovative processes (Barker and 
Mueller, 2002) as a part of their firm’s growth strategies.  
According to the upper echelons theory, younger executives are more willing to take risks toward 
novel practices whereas older executives might prefer being risk averse by embracing conservative 
managerial approaches (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). From another supportive perspective, which is 
the information-processing theory (Howard and Morgenroth, 1968), younger executives can better 
integrate and process critical information so that they make more effective decisions with confidence 
compared to those of older executives. Thus, we can suggest that the CEO age has important 
implications on the overall firm performance.  
In the context of spin-offs, as a consequence of becoming recently independent, all managerial and 
operational activities will be run by a “brand new” executive team in these subsidiaries. These 
executives, especially the CEO, may have to take bold actions without fear and make prompt changes 
as necessary. Instead of being “committed” to pre-spin-off business practices, a younger CEO is 




expected to be more inclined to adapt new practices within the new firm by also making “healthier” 
choices due to his/ her mental stamina (Child, 1974). In other words, younger CEOs will not be afraid 
of trying something new and can further push his/ her agenda toward accomplishing a steady and 
stronger growth in the market. Thus, unless the CEO possesses a “fresh” mindset embracing new 
practices and ideas, unfortunately the subsidiary may not survive long without even establishing a 
competitive posture. Therefore, we argue that younger CEOs will have a positive effect on the change 
in market performance of the subsidiary.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The CEO age negatively influences the change in market value of the subsidiary. 
 
CEO EXTERNAL BOARD MEMBERSHIPS 
 
External ties of executives become very important while implementing corporate strategies 
(Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). The CEO has a critical responsibility for constantly making 
“strategic choices under conditions of information overload and ambiguity” (Geletkanycz and 
Hambrick, 1997: 655). While making these choices, they may need to utilize their external ties in order 
to acquire a different set of information as well as gain some diverse insight for other strategic 
alternatives (Cyert and March, 1963). Parallel to arguments of the resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), these external ties will become a “strategic bridge” between their firms 
and other valuable resources and information available in the industry.  
As argued by Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011), as long as the CEO’s external board memberships are 
“well-aligned” with firm’s current strategic goals and related environmental challenges, these ties will 
become very advantageous while trying to come up with alternative solutions to complex 
organizational problems. Through these external directorships, the CEO can also attain in-depth 
strategic knowledge regarding the industry (Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011). Oh (2018) found that CEO’s 
external directorships are positively associated with the industry-adjusted R&D intensity of focal firms. 
Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein (2001) also argue that these sorts of external top-level connections 
can provide the firm with “important legitimacy and status benefits” (p. 890), which are all “vital” for 
spun-off subsidiaries due to their recently-independent status.  
In the context of spin-offs, the CEO of the subsidiary may have to deal with many more ambiguities 
compared to those of “already established” companies. These issues might stem from the necessity 
of resources, ineffective managerial practices, or the lack of knowledge about the external 
environment including industry rivals’ competencies. Since the CEO is the ultimate responsible top 
executive for the firm’s overall success, these external board memberships can help him/ her better 
understand how to effectively deal with complexity and appropriately formulate strategies by 
considering those of other companies “proven” previously. In addition, if the CEO of a subsidiary sits 
on other boards, he/ she can gain an additional insight on how other organizations handle their unique 
challenges and whether their strategies can be applicable within his/ her firm in order to create better 
market value. Thus, CEO’s external connections will serve as a critical strategic tool for the market 
success of spun-off subsidiaries. Therefore, we argue that the CEO’s external board memberships will 
have a positive effect on the change in market performance of the subsidiary.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The CEO’s external board memberships positively influence the change in market 









THE INTERACTION EFFECT OF CEO AGE AND EXTERNAL BOARD MEMBERSHIPS 
 
CEO age, as an upper echelons characteristic, is considered a strong proxy for determining these top 
executives’ behaviors and strategic choices (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders, 2004). As argued 
earlier in our hypothesis 1, younger CEOs of spun-off subsidiaries are expected to help their companies 
obtain a better market valuation due to their mental stamina and risk taking-oriented mindset. In 
addition to that, according to our hypothesis 2, CEO external board memberships are expected to 
become extremely beneficial for these subsidiaries due to the fact that these top executives can gain 
immense knowledge by sitting on those external boards (Geletkanycz et al., 2001) in addition to 
helping their “brand new” firms establish their reputation and legitimacy. By combining both 
arguments, we predict that a younger CEO sitting on some external boards will help the spun-off 
subsidiary better improve its market valuation.  
 
Hypothesis 3: If a younger CEO of the firm sits on some external boards, the change in market 






SDC Platinum database was used to identify all completed corporate U.S. spin-offs that took place 
between 2000 and 2014. To ensure consistency in our sample, only those spun-off subsidiaries in which 
100% of outstanding shares were distributed on a pro rata basis to shareholders of the divesting firm 
were included. To further confirm the accuracy of our sample, we used some online resources such as 
The Wall Street Journal and Lexis/Nexis as well. As a result of that, our initial sample size included 205 
completed spin-offs. Since some spun-off subsidiaries were merged into or acquired by other bigger 
companies or went out of business, our sample size went down to 149. And finally, to ensure more 
robustness in our results (Wilcox and Keselman, 2012), we identified and removed outliers, which 
basically included cases with “extreme” values. Thus, we had 138 spun-off subsidiaries in our very final 
sample.  
We used the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website to collect the data on 
corporate governance. The CompuStat database was also used to collect the data related to the firm 
and industry. In our data analysis, we used a one-year lag so that we would hold consistency with the 
financial information across all subsidiaries. For example, in the case of a spin-off event completed in 
August of 2005, we used the financial data for this case from the beginning of 2006 as the “initial” 




There were two independent variables in our analyses: CEO age and external board memberships. We 
also controlled for several other variables. We estimated the change in market value of spun-off 
subsidiaries two years after the corporate separation from their corporate parents. Figure 1 shows our 
conceptual model including all variables with their empirically-tested results.  
Weighted least square (WLS) regression was used to test all our models. In the literature, the WLS 
regression is defined as “the best linear unbiased estimator” (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2017: 19). As 
Romano and Wolf (2017) further argue, since the WLS “correctly weights” the data, it enables 
researchers to gain more efficient results compared to those of other regular linear estimations. 
Furthermore, we were also able to obtain heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors 




(Hoechle, 2007; Long and Ervin, 2000) in the results. Our full regression and interaction models are 
expressed below: 
 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 − 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 (𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙)
= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜖𝜖1 
 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 − 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 (𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎)
= 𝛽𝛽′0 + 𝛽𝛽
′
1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽
′
2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠






Our dependent variable in this study is the percentage change in the market value of equity (MVE) of 
the spun-off subsidiary within two years following the spin-off event. The MVE was measured by the 
number of common shares outstanding times the closing annual share price. By using this percentage 
change, we aimed to identify the incline (or decline) in these spun-off subsidiaries’ market success 
after becoming independent entities. Since the market value of equity is proved to be a good indicator 
for future earning of companies in the previous research (Abeysekera, 2011), our dependent variable 
has also allowed us to better identify potential investors’ perceptions on these subsidiaries. Following 
arguments in the literature (Mira, Goergen, and O’Sullivan, 2018), we adjusted our dependent variable 




CEO age was measured by the age of CEO (Filatotchev, Chahine, and Bruton, 2016). CEO external 
directorships was measured by the number of directorships the CEO holds at other firms (Geletkanycz 




We included a variety of control variables that could potentially influence our outcome variable. CEO 
origin indicated whether the CEO had worked under the parent firm prior to the spin-off event (Wruck 
and Wruck, 2002). This variable was coded as 0 for “outsiders” and 1 for “insiders”. CEO duality 
indicated whether the CEO and the chairman of the board were same individuals (Joseph, Ocasio, and 
McDonnell, 2014). We coded 1 for duality structure and 0 for non-duality structure. Board size was 
measured as the total number of directors on the board (Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary, 2003). Firm 
size was measured as the logged number of employees of the child firm (Cabral and Mata, 2003; 
Verwaal and Donkers, 2002). Firm capital intensity was measured as capital expenses over total sales 
for each spun-off subsidiary (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2011; Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010). Firm sales 
growth reflected the change (logged) in sales in two years after the corporate separation (Collins and 
Smith, 2006). Firm leverage was measured as the ratio of total debt over total assets (Opler et al., 
1999). Year dummy indicated financial crises years including 2001-2002 and 2008-2009 (Thams, Chacar, 
and Wiersema, 2017). We coded 1 for crises years and 0 for other years. Industry R&D intensity was 
measured as the average ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales for all companies belonging to the 
same three-digit SIC industry (Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010). Industry advertising intensity was 
measured as the average ratios of advertising expenditures to total sales for all companies belonging 




to the same three-digit SIC industry (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2011). Sector dummy reflected two main 
industry types, which as manufacturing and service (Guthrie, 2001). We coded 1 for manufacturing 
firms and 0 for service firms. And finally, the CEO ownership was measured as the percentage of equity 




In Table 1, we present the results for descriptive statistics and correlations as well as levels of 
significance for all variables. The average age of CEOs is 53. The average number of external 
directorships hold by the CEO is 1.14. This shows that CEOs, on average, sit on one other board. 
According to the correlation matrix, almost all correlation coefficients are lower than 0.4. In addition, 
all variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below 2.00. Since the mean VIF appears to be 1.32, we can 
conclude that there is no multicollinearity issue in this study (Barako and Brown, 2008; Carpenter, 
2002). By also mean-centering values of all independent variables, possible multicollinearity issues 
were further minimized (Aiken and West, 1991).  
In Table 2, we present our regression results. Model 1 only includes control variables. In Models 2 
and 3, we add our predictors in the order of CEO age and external directorships. Model 4 shows the 
results for our interaction effect. According to these results, the coefficient for CEO age in predicting 
the change in market valuation of the spun-off subsidiary was negative and statistically significant (b 
= -0.009; p < 0.1), providing support for Hypothesis 1; and the coefficient for CEO external directorships 
in predicting this change was positive and statistically significant (b = 0.087; p < 0.1), providing support 
for Hypothesis 2. Regarding our moderation, the interaction effect of CEO age and external 
directorships on this change was negative and statistically significant (b = -0.0003; p < 0.05), providing 
support for Hypothesis 3. We show this moderating relationship in Figure 2. Thus, all our hypotheses 























































Table 2. Independent Models of CEO Age and External Board Memberships (Robust Standard Errors 
in Parentheses) 
DV: Change in 
market value (ln) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control Variables 








































































































CEO age x CEO 
external 
directorships 
--- --- --- -0.0003** (0.0001) 
Sample size 138 138 138 138 
R-squared 0.294 0.330 0.3332 0.346 










This empirical study examines whether CEO age and external board memberships including their 
interaction effect influence the change in market valuation of spun-off subsidiaries following the 
separation from their corporate parents. We established our arguments based on two well-established 
theories, namely upper echelons and resource dependence. Our results proved that the CEO age had 
a negative, significant impact on this change whereas CEO external board memberships had a positive, 
significant impact. Regarding the moderation, we found that the interaction effect of CEO age and 
external board membership on this change was negative and significant. We discuss theoretical 
contributions and managerial implications of these findings including limitations and future research 




Our results add to the corporate governance literature by proving that CEO age and external 
directorships as well as their interaction indeed matter in the context of improving spun-off 
subsidiaries’ market performance. Specifically, we find that younger CEOs along with their external 
board memberships will help better improve market valuation of these subsidiaries. As Strange et al. 
(2009) argue, in order to keep all stakeholders committed to the firm, it is vital that firms both 
generate positive financial outcomes and survive in the long run, which can be achieved via utilizing 
effective governance practices. Our research results here clearly indicate that demographic 
characteristics of “key” decision-makers in organizations will become significant influencers for 
improving subsidiaries’ post-spin-off market success. 
Our results for first hypothesis revealed that CEO age had a significant and negative effect on the 
change in market valuation. According to the upper echelons theory, younger executives tend to 
strongly support strategic change in their organizations and are more willing to take risky actions by 
implementing new and innovative strategies. In particular, younger CEOs are able (and more open) to 
make decisions without being committed to the status quo since they have the ability to better 
process and integrate complicated information. As our results demonstrate, younger CEOs of the 
subsidiary will become very beneficial in terms of improving their firm’s market valuation. Tian, 
Haleblian, and Rajagopalan (2010) have also found that the CEO age has a negative and significant 
impact on the abnormal stock returns, which is parallel with our current findings. After becoming an 
independent firm, the subsidiary’s survival process is going to be mainly all about change and newness. 
If the CEO is able to initiate these changes and act without fear, their firms can gain their “accepted” 
status among industry rivals much faster. This will also help these recently-independent companies 
convince their investors about their long-term organizational survival. Therefore, a younger CEO will 
provide the subsidiary with a “stronger push” toward an improved market performance.  
Our results for second hypothesis showed that CEO external board memberships significantly and 
positively influenced the change in market valuation of subsidiaries. As upper echelons and decision-
making theorists argue, CEOs have to make very critical decisions under ambiguity and information 
overload in his/her regular routine. This situation requires the CEO critically analyze all this complicated 
information constantly. Previous research has found positive connections between CEO external 
directorships and firm’s long-term performance (Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011). Thus, we can argue that 
if the CEO becomes aware of alternative strategies and gains more experience in how to govern better 
via sitting on some external boards, he/ she can handle these complex situations more effectively, 
which is also expected to send positive signals to the market. In the context of spun-off subsidiaries, 
this outcome will become extremely critical since these CEOs need to collect all the input from both 
internal and external environment of the firm in order to take timely preventive and competitive 




actions in their recently-independent companies. In addition, since these subsidiaries are seeking 
legitimacy in the industry after being separated from their corporate parents, having a CEO sitting on 
other boards will assist them with better establishing themselves as stand-alone entities. Therefore, 
this finding tells us that CEO external directorships should be considered a critical factor for an 
improved market success of the subsidiary.  
And finally, our moderation results provided significant results for the interaction effect of CEO age 
and external board memberships. According to Figure 2, we can interpret this finding as follows: If a 
CEO is young and sits on some other companies’ boards, this will help these subsidiaries further 
improve its market valuation. In other words, CEO external board memberships makes the effect of 
CEO age on the change in market valuation of corporate spin-offs much stronger. Thus, we can 
conclude that younger CEOs who also sit on external boards will significantly benefit to the subsidiary’s 
market performance.  
Overall, this paper contributes to the governance literature in a couple unique ways. First of all, it 
provides a unique insight about the effect of critical governance mechanisms on the change in market 
valuation of spun-off subsidiaries. Second, it proves the importance and applicability of both upper 
echelons and resource dependence theories in the context of corporate spin-offs. Third, our 
regression results identify two characteristics of CEO (age and external board memberships) to be 
significantly correlated with our dependent variable. And finally, our moderated regression results 
show that the interaction of both CEO characteristics will significantly influence our outcome variable 
as well. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
Although this study has made important contributions to the literature, we also recognize its 
limitations. First of all, this study uses the change in market valuation as the outcome variable. Future 
studies can consider looking at different performance variables. Second, our study only includes 
corporate spin-offs in the U.S. It would be interesting to see whether we might still find similar results 
in the international context. Third, our study is solely based on the secondary data. Future research 
can improve our findings by collecting primary data on executives’ cognitive and behavioral 
characteristics and examining their impacts on the firm performance. And finally, it might be fruitful 
to add more explanatory variables related to the composition of top management teams and board 
of directors.  
 
MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
In order to successfully govern spun-off subsidiaries, according to our results, we offer critical 
empirically-grounded insights for choosing the “best” CEOs. Our results suggest that CEO 
characteristics significantly matter in explaining the market success of the child firm. In particular, we 
find that younger CEOs and the number of their external directorships will help the child firm better 
improve its market performance. In addition, our results reveal that if a CEO is young and sits on 
external boards at the same time, we should expect to see a much better market performance of the 
spun-off subsidiary. Therefore, these “qualities” of CEOs should be taken into serious consideration 












In conclusion, spin-offs has been considered a “popular” corporate restructuring technique in the U.S. 
in the recent decades. Although this technique has been executed by many companies to create a 
better value for themselves and their subsidiaries, how these spun-off units can truly “stand alone” as 
independent companies is still a big question in the eyes of investors and the industry itself. This 
empirical study has revealed an important fact that particular CEO characteristics will matter to help 
these companies improve their market valuation. We hope that our study grounded in the upper 
echelons and resource dependence theories will reiterate the importance of governance mechanisms 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model including Empirically-Tested Results 





















Figure 2. The Interaction Effect of CEO Age and External Directorships on the Change in 
Market Valuation of Spun-off Subsidiaries 
